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ABSTRACT
This paper estimates regime-switching rules for monetary policy and tax policy over the post-war
period in the United States and imposes the estimated policy process on a calibrated dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities. Decision rules are locally unique and
produce a stationary long-run rational expectations equilibrium in which (lump-sum) tax shocks
always affect output and inflation. Tax non-neutralities in the model arise solely through the
mechanism articulated by the fiscal theory of the price level. The paper quantifies that mechanism
and finds it to be important in U.S. data, reconciling a popular class of monetary models with the
evidence that tax shocks have substantial impacts. Because long-run policy behavior determines
existence  and  uniqueness  of  equilibrium,  in  a  regime-switching  environment  more  accurate
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1. Introduction
A popular approach to analyzing macroeconomic policy posits simple policy rules
and characterizes how alternative policy speciﬁcations perform in dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium models. This line of work has shown that simple rules seem
to explain observed policy choices quite well and that those rules produce desirable
outcomes in popular classes of dynamic monetary models. Most of the work makes
convenient assumptions that allow monetary and ﬁscal rules to be studied separately.
Because these assumptions are questionable, it has long been known that the result-
ing conclusions could be misleading. Recent work, particularly the ﬁscal theory of
the price level, emphasizes that assumptions about how monetary and ﬁscal policies
interaction can be important.
Research on policy interactions has spawned a number of results that have become
part of the standard reasoning about macroeconomic policy: (1) an active monetary
policy that raises the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one with inﬂation–the
“Taylor principle”–is necessary for stability of the economy [Taylor (1993)]; (2) the
Taylor principle delivers good economic performance in widely used models [Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1997), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)]; (3) high and variable
inﬂation rates may be due to failure of central banks to obey the Taylor principle,
leaving the price level undetermined and subject to self-fulﬁlling expectations [Clar-
ida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)]; (4) the combination of
active monetary policy and passive tax policy insulates the economy from aggregate
demand disturbances, such as those arising from tax-debt policies [Leeper (1991)].
As with earlier work that focused on monetary or ﬁscal rules separately, the deriva-
tion of these results rests on a number of assumptions of convenience that simplify
the nature of monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions. The authors usually note that
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diﬀerent sets of equally plausible assumptions may lead to qualitatively diﬀerent out-
comes. For example, there is now a growing literature providing counter-examples
to the desirability of the Taylor principle [Benhabib and Farmer (2000), Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001a,b, 2002), Zanna (2003)].
Perhaps the least plausible assumption in this work is that policy regime is ﬁxed.
This implies that agents always expect the current policy regime to last forever–
regime change, if it occurs, comes as a complete surprise. Of course, a major branch
of the applied side of the literature consists of identifying periods of diﬀerent policy
regimes [Taylor (1999a, 2000), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Auerbach (2002),
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Sala (2004), Favero and Monacelli (2005)]. But, as
Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon (1984) argue, it makes little sense to assume policy
makers are contemplating regime change when agents put zero probability on this
event. Despite the empirical evidence and Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon’s compelling
logic, there is little modeling of environments where recurring regime change is sto-
chastic and the objects that change are the rules governing how policy authorities
respond to the economy.
1
This paper aims to bring the applied and theoretical lines of this literature closer
together by studying a model with a simple, but empirically plausible, speciﬁcation of
regime changes. We estimate Markov-switching rules for monetary and ﬁscal policy.
Monetary policy obeys a Taylor rule that makes the nominal interest rate depend on
inﬂation and the output gap; ﬁscal policy adjusts taxes as a function of government
debt and other variables. All the parameters of the rules, including the error vari-
ances, evolve according to a Markov process. The estimated policy process leads to a
locally unique and stationary equilibrium in a calibrated dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model with nominal rigidities.
There are ﬁve main ﬁndings.
First, the estimates uncover periods of active monetary/passive ﬁscal behavior, the
policy mix typically assumed to prevail in monetary studies; there are also episodes
of passive monetary/active ﬁscal behavior, the mix associated with the ﬁscal theory
of the price level.
2 Remaining periods combine passive monetary with passive ﬁscal
1Some work considers recurring regime switching in exogenous processes, including exogenously
evolving policy variables [Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), Davig (2003, 2004b), Leeper and Zha
(2003), Schorfheide (2003)]. There have also been eﬀo r t st oi n c o r p o r a t eo n e - t i m er e g i m ec h a n g e s
into general equilibrium models of the ﬁscal theory [Sims (1997), Woodford (1998b), Loyo (1999),
Mackowiak (2002), Daniel (2003), Weil (2003)].
2We apply the terminology in Leeper (1991). Active monetary policy arises when the response of
the nominal interest rate is more than one-for-one to inﬂation and passive monetary policy occurs
when that response is less than one-for-one. Analogously, passive ﬁscal policy occurs when theFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 3
policy or active monetary with active ﬁscal behavior. We argue that these results
connect well to ﬁxed-regime estimates of policy rules and narrative accounts of policy.
Second, post-war U.S. data can be modeled as a single, locally unique equilibrium.
While our empirical results are largely consistent with existing estimates from ﬁxed-
regime models, we avoid the necessary implication of those models that the econ-
omy lurched unexpectedly among periods of indeterminacy (passive/passive), non-
existence of equilibrium (active/active), or unique equilibria with completely diﬀerent
characteristics (active monetary/passive ﬁscal or passive monetary/active ﬁscal) [see,
for example, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), or Sala
(2004) for such interpretations]. Instead, in a regime-switching setup those periods
are merely alternative realizations of the state vector over which agents’ decision rules
are deﬁned. Consequently, in a switching model the policy episodes have strikingly
diﬀerent implications. For example, an empirical ﬁnding that over some sub-period
monetary policy has been active and ﬁscal policy has been passive is perfectly consis-
tent with there being important impacts from (lump-sum) tax shocks. A ﬁnding that
both monetary and ﬁscal behavior have been passive need not imply the equilibrium
is indeterminate. And the economy can temporarily experience active/active policies
w i t h o u td i r ee c o n o m i cc o n s e q u e n c e s .
Third, the ﬁscal theory of the price level is always operative. Shocks to (lump-sum)
t a x e sa l w a y sa ﬀect aggregate demand, even when the rules in place at a given moment
would suggest that Ricardian equivalence should hold if regime were ﬁxed. The ﬁscal
theory is operating whenever it is possible for ﬁscal policy to become active. Then a
cut in current taxes, ﬁnanced by sales of nominal government debt, does not generate
an expectation that future taxes will rise by at least enough to service the new debt.
The tax reduction leaves households feeling wealthier, at initial prices and interest
rates, and they perceive they can raise their consumption paths.
3 When nominal
rigidities are present, the expansion in demand for goods raises output and inﬂation.
Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2004) show that in a regime-switching environment, the
ﬁscal theory is always at work, as long as agents believe there is a positive probability
of moving to a regime with active ﬁscal policy. In this paper, that belief is governed
by the long-run properties of the estimated policy process.
Fourth, the ﬁscal theory mechanism is quantitatively signiﬁcant in U.S. data, ac-
cording to the model.
4 Through that mechanism alone, a surprise transitory tax cut
of $1 raises the discounted present value of output in the long run by between 76
response of taxes to debt exceeds the real interest rate and active ﬁscal policy occurs when taxes do
not respond suﬃciently to debt to cover real interest payments. In many models, a unique stationary
equilibrium requires one active and one passive policy.
3See Leeper (1991), Woodford (1994, 1995), Sims (1994), and Cochrane (1999, 2001).FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 4
cents and $1.02, depending on which policy regime the simulation conditions. A tem-
porary tax cut of 2 percent of output increases the long-run price level by between 1.2
percent and 6.7 percent, conditional on remaining in a given monetary-ﬁscal regime.
Similar impacts arise from an anticipated cut in taxes. Stochastic simulations that
draw from the estimated distribution for policy regime imply that with 80 percent
probability the output multiplier lies between 43 cents and $1.36 after 6 years, while a
tax cut of 2 percent of output raises the price level between 0.53 to 2.27 percent after
6 years. These numbers suggest the ﬁscal theory mechanism may be quite potent in
U.S. data, helping to reconcile a popular class of DSGE models for monetary policy
with the empirical evidence that tax disturbances have important impacts [Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), Mountford and Uhlig (2002), Perotti (2004)].
Fifth, viewing time series as generated by recurring regime change alters how those
time series should be interpreted. Many estimates of policy rules use ap r i o r iinforma-
tion about policy behavior in order to condition on sub-samples in which a particular
regime prevailed. This procedure can obtain accurate estimates of policy parameters
and the impacts of policy disturbances. But embedding the estimated rules in ﬁxed-
regime DSGE models can lead to seriously misleading qualitative inferences when a
regime-switching environment generates the data. Because long-run policy behavior
determines the qualitative features of data, more accurate inferences can be gleaned
from full-sample information than by conditioning on regime.
Taken together, the paper’s ﬁndings lead to a fundamental reassessment of results
(1)-(4) that guide macro policy research. The ﬁndings also lead us to argue that to
understand macroeconomic policy eﬀects, it is essential to model policy regimes (or
rules) as governed by a stochastic process over which agents form expectations. This
argument puts on the table a new interpretation of macro policies and their impacts.
5
4Cochrane (1999) interprets U.S. inﬂation in light of the ﬁscal theory and Woodford (2001) points
to particular historical episodes when the ﬁscal theory might have been relevant. But neither author
claims to have found joint monetary-ﬁscal behavior consistent with the ﬁscal theory and neither
author tries to quantify the ﬁscal theory mechanism.
5The table is pretty full. Included among purely monetary interpretations are narratives [DeLong
(1997), Mayer (1998), Romer and Romer (2004)], ﬁxed regime [Orphanides (2003a)], permanent
regime change [Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)], adaptive learning
[Cogley and Sargent (2002a,b), Primiceri (2004), Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2004)], model uncer-
tainty [Cogley and Sargent (2004)], and regime-switching identiﬁed VARs [Sims and Zha (2004)].
Work that integrates monetary and ﬁscal policy includes Leeper and Sims (1994), Romer and Romer
(1994), and Sala (2004).FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 5
2. Estimated Policy Rules
We seek empirical characterizations of policy behavior that use simple rules of the
kind appearing in the policy literature, but allow for recurring changes in regime.
Monetary and tax regimes can switch independently of each other. This section re-
ports maximumlikelihood estimates of policy rules whose parameters evolve according
to a hidden Markov chain, as in Hamilton (1989) and Kim and Nelson (1999).
2.1. Speciﬁcations. For monetary policy, we estimate a standard Taylor (1993)
speciﬁcation, which Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) have shown is nearly optimal
in the class of models we consider in section 3. The rule makes the nominal interest
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t is the monetary policy regime. Regime evolves according to a Markov
chain with transition matrix PM.rand π are net rates. We allow for four states,
with the parameters restricted to take only two sets of values, while the variance may
take four diﬀerent values. PM is a 4 × 4 matrix.
6
Unlike monetary policy, there is no widely accepted speciﬁcation for ﬁscal policy.
7
We model some of the complexity of tax policy with a rule that allows for the rev-
enue impacts of automatic stabilizers, some degree of pay-as-you-go spending, and
a response to the state of government indebtedness. The rule links revenues net of
transfer payments, τt, to current government purchases, gt, the output gap, and debt
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t is the ﬁscal policy regime, which obeys a Markov chain with transition
matrix PF for the two ﬁscal states. Both (1) and (2) allow for heteroskedastic errors,
which Sims and Zha (2004) emphasize are essential for ﬁtting U.S. time series.
Let St =( SM
t ,SF
t ) denote the joint monetary/ﬁscal policy state. The joint distri-
bution of policy regimes evolves according to a Markov chain with transition matrix
P = PM ⊗PF, whose typical element is pij =P r [ St = j |St−1 = i], where
P
j pij =1 .
With independent switching, the joint policy process has eight states.
6Ireland (2004), Leeper and Roush (2003), and Sims and Zha (2004) argue that allowing money
growth to enter the monetary policy rule is important for identifying policy behavior. To keep to a
speciﬁcation that is comparable to the Taylor rule literature, we exclude money growth.
7Examples of estimated ﬁscal rules include Bohn (1998), Taylor (2000), Fatas and Mihov (2001),
Auerbach (2003), Cohen and Follette (2003), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2004), and Claeys
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2.2. Estimation Results. We use quarterly U.S. data from 1948:2 to 2004:1. To
obtain estimates of (1) that resemble those from the Taylor rule literature, we deﬁne
πt to be the inﬂation rate over the past four quarters. Similarly, estimates of (2) use
the average debt-output ratio over the previous four quarters as a measure of bt−1.
The nominal interest rate is the three-month Treasury bill rate in the secondary
market. Inﬂation is the log diﬀerence in the GDP deﬂator. The output gap is the log
deviation of real GDP from the Congressional Budget Oﬃce’s measure of potential
real GDP. All ﬁscal variables are for the federal government only. τ is federal tax
receipts net of total federal transfer payments as a share of GDP, b is the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas’ market value of gross marketable federal debt held by the
public as a share of GDP, and g is federal government consumption plus investment
expenditures as a share of GDP. All variables are converted to quarterly values.
Parameter estimates are reported in tables 1 and 2 (standard errors in parentheses)
and estimated transition matrices are in table 3.
8
For monetary policy, associated with each set of feedback parameters is a high-
and a low-variance state.9 Monetary policy behavior breaks into periods when it
responds strongly to inﬂation (active policy) and periods when it does not (passive
policy). In the active, volatile periods, the standard deviation is 3.7 times higher than
in the active, docile periods; in passive periods, the standard deviations diﬀer by a
factor of seven. Passive regimes respond twice as strongly to the output gap, which
is consistent with the Fed paying relatively less attention to inﬂation stabilization.
There are also important diﬀerences in duration of regime. Active regimes last about
15 quarters each, on average, while the duration of the docile passive regime is over
22 quarters; the volatile passive regime is most transient, with a duration of 11.6
quarters.
Tax policies ﬂuctuate between responding by more than the quarterly real interest
rate to debt (passive) and responding negatively to debt (active). The active policy
is what one would expect from automatic stabilizers, which reduce revenues and raise
debt as national income falls. Active policy reacts strongly to government spending,
though by less than one-to-one, while passive policy reacts more weakly. In both
8To follow existing empirical work on simple policy rules, the paper does not estimate the rules
as parts of a fully speciﬁed model. We are reassured in doing this by the model-based estimates of
Ireland (2004) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), which are very close to single-equation estimates
of Taylor rules. It is noteworthy, though, that in an identiﬁed switching VAR, Sims and Zha (2004)
conclude that monetary policy was consistently active since 1960; they do not consider ﬁscal behavior
and their switching speciﬁcation is more restricted than ours along some dimensions.
9We include a dummy variable to absorb the variability in interest rates induced by credit controls
in the second and third quarters of 1980. See Schreft (1990) for a detailed account of those controls.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 7
regimes taxes rise systematically and strongly with the output gap, as one would
expect from built-in stabilizers in the tax system. A stronger response to output under
passive policy is consistent with active policy pursuing countercyclical objectives more
vigorously.
2.3. Plausibility of Estimates. We consider four checks on the plausibility of the
estimated rules. First, are the estimates reasonable on ap r i o r igrounds? We think
they are, as the rules ﬂuctuate between theoretically interpretable regimes. Monetary
policy ﬂuctuates between periods when it is active, satisfying the Taylor principle
(απ > 1), and periods when it is passive (απ < 1). Passive tax policy responds to
debt by a coeﬃcient that exceeds most estimates of the quarterly real interest rate,
while active tax policy lowers taxes when debt is high.
Second, how well do the estimated equations track the actual paths of the inter-
est rate and taxes? We use the estimates of equations (1) and (2), weighted by the
estimated regime probabilities, to predict the time paths of the short-term nominal
interest rate, r, and the ratio of tax revenues to output, τ, treating all explana-
tory variables as evolving exogenously. The predicted–using smoothed and ﬁltered
probabilities–and actual paths of r and τ appear in ﬁgures 1 and 2. These ﬁts are
easily comparable to those reported by, for example, Taylor (1999a) for monetary
policy.10 The interest-rate equation goes oﬀ track in the 1950s, suggesting that that
period might constitute a third distinct regime, but in three-regime speciﬁcations the
response of policy to output was negative. The tax rule tracks the revenue-output
ratio extremely well, except in the last year or so when revenues dropped precipitously.
Third, do the periods estimated to be active and passive jibe with narrative ac-
counts of policy history?
11 The estimated marginal probabilities of the monetary and
ﬁscal states are plotted in ﬁgures 3 and 4. All probabilities reported are at time t,
conditional on information available at t − 1.
Figure 3 reports that, except for a brief active period in 1959-60, monetary policy
was passive from 1948 until the Fed changed operating procedures October 1979 and
policy became active. Monetary policy was consistently active except immediately
10Orphanides (2003b) argues that the poor U.S. inﬂation performance from 1965-1979 was due
to a strong policy response to poor estimates of the output gap available at the time, rather than
a weak response to inﬂation. Using real-time data on the gap and inﬂation, he claims the ﬁto fa
conventional Taylor rule speciﬁcation is much improved when real-time data are used rather recent
vintage data. Orphanides (2003a) extends this argument to the 1950s. The ﬁt of our switching
regression for monetary policy is far superior to Orphanides’s over the 1960:2-1966:4 period, yet our
results label this as a period of passive monetary policy.
11This draws on Pechman (1987), Poterba (1994), Stein (1996), Steuerle (2002), Romer and
Romer (2004), and Yang (2004a).FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 8
after the two recessions in 1991 and 2001. For extended periods during the so-called
“jobless recoveries” monetary policy continued to be less responsive to inﬂation for
t w oo rm o r ey e a r sa f t e rt h eo ﬃcial troughs of the downturns. The passive episode in
1991 became active when the Fed launched its preemptive strike against inﬂation in
1994.
These results are broadly consistent with previous ﬁndings. From the beginning
of the sample until the Treasury Accord of March 1951, Federal Reserve policy sup-
ported high bond prices to the exclusion of targeting inﬂation, an extreme form of
passive monetary policy. Through the Korean War, monetary policy largely accom-
modated the ﬁnancing needs of ﬁscal policy [Ohanian (1997) and Woodford (2001)].
Romer and Romer (2002) oﬀer narrative evidence that Fed objectives and views
about the economy in the 1950s were very much like those in the 1990s, particularly
in its overarching concern about inﬂation. But Romer and Romer (2002, p. 123)
quote Chairman William McChesney Martin’s congressional testimony, in which he
explained that “the 1957-58 recession was a direct result of letting inﬂation get sub-
stantially ahead of us.” The Romers also mention that FOMC “members felt they
had not reacted soon enough in 1955 [to oﬀset the burst of inﬂation]” (p. 122). To
buttress their narrative case, the Romers estimate a forward-looking Taylor rule from
1952:1-1958:4. They conclude that policy was active: the response of the interest rate
to inﬂation was 1.178 with a standard error of 0.876. Our estimate of this response
coeﬃc i e n ti np a s s i v er e g i m e si s0 . 5 2 2 ,w h i c hi sl e s st h a no n es t a n d a r de r r o rb e l o w
t h eR o m e r s ’p o i n te s t i m a t e .T h eF e dm i g h tw e l lh a v ei n t e n d e dt ob ev i g i l a n ta g a i n s t
inﬂation, but it appears not to have acted to prevent the 1955 inﬂation. The brief
burst of active monetary policy late in 1959 and early in 1960 is consistent with the
Romers’ (2002) ﬁnding that the Fed raised the real interest rate in this period to
combat inﬂation. From 1960-1979, monetary policy responded weakly to inﬂation,
while since the mid-1980s the Fed has reacted strongly to inﬂation, a pattern found in
many studies [Taylor (1999a), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Romer and Romer
(2002) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)].
The estimates of passive monetary policy behavior following the 1991 and 2001
recessions are likely to conﬂict with some readers’ priors. Other evidence, however,
corroborates the estimates. As early as March 1993, after the federal funds rate had
been at 3 percent for several months, during policy deliberations Governors Angell,
LaWare, and Mullins expressed concern that the Fed was keeping the rate low for
too long. Angell warned that “our progress to get inﬂation down low enough so it
[isn’t a factor aﬀecting] any business decision is now in jeopardy” (p. 30) [Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1993b)]. At that March FOMC meeting,FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 9
Governors Angell and Lindsey dissented on the vote to maintain the funds rate at 3
percent. Six months later, Mullins analogized 1993 to the 1970s as another “period in
which perhaps short rates weren’t appropriately set to track inﬂation” (p. 11) [Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1993a)].
More recently, close observers of the Fed have expressed similar concerns, citing
the rapid growth in liquidity in 2003 and 2004 and the exceptionally low real inter-
est rates since 2001 [Unsigned (2005a,b)]. Financial economists list unusually low
interest rates as an important factor behind the spectacular growth in household and
corporate debt in recent years [Unsigned (2002) and Roach (2004)]. These sentiments
about monetary policy behavior in the early 1990s and 2000s are consistent with our
estimates that the Fed responded only weakly to inﬂa t i o ni nt h o s ep e r i o d s .
Estimates of the tax rule in (2) reveal substantially more regime instability than
for monetary policy. Over the post-war period, there were 12 ﬁscal regime changes,
with tax policy spending 55 percent of the time in the active regime. Figure 4 shows
that the model associates tax policy with regimes that accord well with narrative his-
tories. Fiscal policy was active in the beginning of the sample. Despite an extremely
high level of debt from World War Two expenditures, Congress overrode President
Truman’s veto in early 1948 and cut taxes. Although, as Stein (1996) recounts the
history, legislators argued that cutting taxes would reduce the debt, the debt-GDP
ratio rose while revenues as a share of GDP fell. In 1950 and 1951 policy became
passive, as taxes were increased and excess proﬁts taxes were extended into 1953 to
ﬁnance the Korean War, consistent with the budget-balancing goals of both the Tru-
man and the Eisenhower Administrations. From the mid-50s, through the Kennedy
tax cut of 1964, and into the second half of the 1960s, ﬁscal policy was active, paying
little attention to debt. There followed a period of about 15 years when ﬁscal policy
ﬂuctuated in its degree of concern about debt relative to economic conditions.
President Carter cut taxes to stimulate the economy in early 1979, initiating a pe-
riod of active ﬁscal policy that extended through the Reagan Administration’s Eco-
nomic Recovery Plan of 1981. By the mid-1980s, the probability of passive tax policy
increased as legislation was passed in 1982 and 1984 to raise revenues in response
to the rapidly increasing debt-output ratio. Following President Clinton’s tax hike
in 1993, ﬁscal policy switched to being passive through the 2001 tax cut. President
Bush’s tax reductions in 2002 and 2003 made ﬁscal policy active again.12
12T h en e g a t i v er e s p o n s eo ft a x e st od e b ti nt h ea c t i v eﬁscal regime might be regarded as perverse.
A negative correlation arises naturally over the business cycle, as recessions automatically lower
revenues and raise debt. Two active ﬁscal regimes, the late 1940s and 1973:4-1975:1, almost exactly
coincide with the cycle. But there are extended periods of active behavior, which include but do
not coincide with recessions [1955:4-1965:2 and 1978:4-1984:3]. There are also instances in whichFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 10
Favero and Monacelli (2005) estimate switching regressions similar to (1) and (2)
and also ﬁnd that monetary policy was passive from 1961 to 1979. In contrast to our
results, they do not detect any tendency to return to passive policy following the 1991
and 2001 recessions, though they estimate one regime, which emerges from 1985:2-
2000:4 and 2002:2-2002:4, in the monetary policy response to inﬂation is exactly unity.
Their estimates of ﬁscal policy are not directly comparable to ours because Favero
and Monacelli use the net-of-interest deﬁcit as the policy variable, which confounds
spending and tax policies. Like us, they ﬁnd that ﬁscal policy is more unstable than
monetary policy.13 Our ﬁndings are also consistent with the time-varying monetary
policy rule estimates of Kim and Nelson (2004). They ﬁnd that the response of
monetary policy to inﬂation is not diﬀerent from unity in the 1970s and the 1990s.
2.4. Joint Policy Process. It is convenient, and does no violence to the qualita-
tive predictions of the theory, to aggregate the four monetary states to two states.
We aggregate the high- and low-variance states for both the active and the passive
regimes, weighted by the regimes’ ergodic probabilities. An analogous transformation








and variances are σ2
R(St = Active)=4 .0576e−6 and σ2
R(St = Passive)=1 .8002e−5.
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Probabilities on the main diagonal are P[AM/PF |AM/PF ],P[AM/AF |AM/AF ],
P[PM/PF|PM/PF], and P[PM/AF|PM/AF]. The transition matrix implies that
all states communicate and each state is recurring, so the economy visits each one
inﬁnitely often.
recessions occur during periods of passive ﬁscal policy [1990:3-1991:1 and 2001:1-2001:4]. Taken
together these results suggest that the tax rule does more than simply identify active regimes with
economic downturns.
13Favero and Monacelli (2005) estimate that through 2002, ﬁscal policy was active in 1961:1-
1974:3, 1975:3-1995:1, and 2001:3-2002:4 and passive otherwise. Our estimates ﬁnd more periods of
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Figure 5 shows that the joint probabilities computed using (4) also correspond to
periods that have been noted in the literature. Both policies were passive in the early
1950s, when the Fed supported bond prices (and gradually phased out that support)
and ﬁscal policy was ﬁnancing the Korean War. From the late 1960s through most
of the 1970s, both policies were again passive. Arguing this, Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2000) claim the policy mix left the equilibrium undetermined, allowing for
bursts of inﬂation and output from self-fulﬁlling expectations. Using data only from
1960-1979, it is easy to see how one might reach this conclusion. The early-to-mid-
1980s, when monetary policy was aggressively ﬁghting inﬂation and ﬁscal policy was
ﬁnancing interest payments with new debt issuances, gets labeled as doubly active
policies. Finally, the mid-1980s on is largely a period of active monetary and passive
ﬁscal policies, as most models of monetary policy assume [for example, the papers in
Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993) and Taylor (1999b)].
Taken together, the marginal and joint probabilities paint a picture of post-war
monetary and ﬁscal policies that is broadly consistent with both narrative accounts
and ﬁxed-regime policy rule estimates.
A ﬁnal check on the plausibility of the estimates asks if the policies make economic
sense when they are embedded in a conventional DSGE model. Sections 6 and 7
answer this question in detail.
3. A Model with Nominal Rigidities
We employ a conventional model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices in
goods markets, extended to include lump-sum taxes and nominal government debt.14






















with 0 <β<1,σ>0,η>0,κ>0,χ>0 and δ>0.C t is a composite consumption












14Detailed expositions appear in Yun (1996, 2004), Woodford (2003), and Schmitt-Grohe and
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The household chooses cjt to minimize expenditure on the continuum of goods














is the aggregate price level at t.






















where τt is lump-sum taxes/transfers from the government to the household, Bt is
one-period nominal bonds, Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for the price at t of
one dollar at t +1 , and Πt is proﬁts from the ﬁrm, which the household owns. The



















If Rt denotes the risk-free gross nominal interest rate between t and t+1, then absence
of arbitrage implies the equilibrium condition
[Et(Qt,t+1)]
−1 =1+rt, (11)












The government demands goods in the same proportion that households do, so the














Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for household optimization are that (9)-(12)
hold at all dates and that households exhaust their intertemporal budget constraints.
The latter condition is equivalent to requiring that the present value of households’
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where At = Bt + Mt and qt,t+1 = Qt,t+1Pt+1/Pt.
3.2. Firms. A continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms produce goods using
labor. Production of good j is
yjt = ZtNjt, (14)
where Zt is aggregate technology, common across ﬁrms and taken to be constant.







where Yt is deﬁned by
Ct + Gt = Yt. (16)







Following Calvo (1983), a fraction 1 − ϕ ﬁrms are permitted to adjust their prices
each period, while the fraction ϕ are not permitted to adjust. If ﬁrms are permitted to
adjust at t, they choose a new optimal price, p∗
t, to maximize the expected discounted
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The ﬁrst-order condition that determines p∗





































where the numerator and the denominator have recursive representations:















Solving (21) for p∗





















where µ ≡ θ/(θ − 1) is the markup.
We assume that individual labor services may be aggregated linearly to produce
aggregate labor, Nt =
R 1
0 Njtdj. Linear aggregation of individual market clearing















It is natural to deﬁne aggregate proﬁts as the sum of individual ﬁrm proﬁts,
Πt =
R 1
0 Πjtdj. Integrating over ﬁrms’ proﬁts and combining the household’s and
the government’s budget constraints yields the aggregate resource constraint
Zt
∆t
Nt = Ct + Gt. (27)
From the deﬁnitions of price dispersion and the aggregate price index, relative price
dispersion evolves according to








t∆t−1, (28)FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 15
where πt = Pt/Pt−1.
3.3. Policy Speciﬁcation. Monetary and tax policies follow (1) and (2), with error
terms that are standard normal and i.i.d. The processes for {Gt,τt,r t,M t,B t} must
satisfy the government budget identity













given M−1 > 0 and (1 + r−1)B−1. Government spending as a share of output is
assumed to be constant.
3.4. Information Assumptions. Although in the empirical estimates in section
2 regime is a state variable hidden from the econometrician, we do not confront
agents in the model with an inference problem. Instead, we assume agents observe
at least current and past policy shocks and regimes. Under conventional information
assumptions, the model is solved assuming that private agents base their decisions




t−j,j ≥ 0} plus the initial
conditions (M−1,(1 + r−1)B−1). This conventional information structure enables us
to quantify the impacts of unanticipated changes in taxes. We also seek to quantify the
eﬀects of anticipated changes in taxes. Those eﬀects are computed by endowing agents
with foreknowledge of tax disturbances, so the model is solved using the expanded
information set Ω∗
t = Ωt ∪ {ετ
t+1}.
3.5. Stationary Equilibria. The algorithm used to solve this model ﬁnds decision
rules that produce stationary equilibria, if they exist, given the estimated exogenous
processes. Our focus on stationary equilibria is driven by empirical and theoretical
considerations. On the empirical side, our aim is to understand post-war U.S. time
series and those time series display no tendency for the debt-GDP ratio to explode.
We take seriously Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba’s (2001) demonstration that if over
time the response of government surplus to total government liabilities is bounded
away from zero inﬁnitely often, then there exist equilibria that exhibit Ricardian
equivalence. But we question the relevance of this proposition for interpreting U.S.
data because it depends on having debt grow without bound.
Turning to theoretical considerations, Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2004) show that
in a ﬂexible-price variant of this regime-switching DSGE model, policies that satisfy
the assumptions of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba’s proposition deliver a non-Ricardian
equilibrium that is unique within the set of equilibria with bounded debt-output
ratios. In addition, Chung (2005) argues that the feasibility of equilibria with un-
bounded debt-output relies on unrealistic assumptions such as lump-sum taxation. InFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 16
a model with only proportional income taxes, it is impossible to service an exploding
debt process. If instead taxes are levied against consumption or bond holdings, tax
eﬀects feed directly into the real interest rate, once again eliminating the possibility
of an equilibrium with unbounded debt.
4. The Fiscal Theory Mechanism
The economics underlying the ﬁscal theory mechanism potentially present in the
model of section 3 relies on the existence of nominal government debt and particular
combinations of monetary and ﬁscal policies. An equilibrium condition that is useful
for heuristic purposes is derived by imposing the transversality condition, (13), on

















The expression states that in equilibrium the real value of nominal government lia-
bilities must equal the expected present value of primary surpluses plus seigniorage.
When this expression imposes restrictions on the stochastic process for the price level,
it does so through the ﬁscal theory mechanism. In that case, Cochrane (1999, 2001)
refers to (30) as a “debt valuation” equation because ﬂuctuations in surpluses or
seigniorage can induce jumps in Pt, which alter the real value of debt to keep it con-
sistent with expected policies.15 Conventional monetary analysis, in contrast, assumes
that monetary policy is active and ﬁscal policy is passive, so (30) holds via adjust-
ments in future surpluses, without imposing any restrictions on the {Pt} process [for
example, Woodford (2003)].
Consider the simple case of an exogenous process for the net-of-interest surplus
(active ﬁscal policy) and a pegged nominal interest rate (passive monetary policy).
16
Ad e b t - ﬁnanced cut in taxes does not raise the present value of future taxes, so
it is perceived by households as raising their wealth. Unlike when productivity or
government purchases change, wealth eﬀects from the ﬁscal theory do not necessarily
stem from a change in the resources available to the economy. Instead, a tax cut
raises the present value of consumption the households believe they can aﬀord at
initial prices and interest rates. This wealth-induced increase in demand for goods
15In the model all debt matures in one period. Cochrane (2001) emphasizes that with long-
maturity debt, the inﬂation consequences of a ﬁscal expansion can be pushed into the future.
16This policy mix does not impose a boundary condition on the inﬂation process, but it does
impose a boundary condition in the real debt process. With nominal liabilities predetermined, the
price level is uniquely determined. This is the canonical ﬁscal theory speciﬁcation [see Woodford
(2001) or Gordon and Leeper (2002)].FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 17
raises output relative to potential, when nominal rigidities are present. But it must
also cause inﬂation and/or real interest rates to adjust in order to satisfy (30). With a
pegged nominal interest rate, the increase in inﬂation lowers the ex-ante real interest
rate, ensuring that the demand for goods expands. Condition (30) emphasizes that it
is changes in the present value of primary surpluses and seigniorage that can trigger
ﬂuctuations in aggregate demand, suggesting that anticipated and unanticipated taxes
have symmetric eﬀects.
Equality between the value of government liabilities and the present value of sur-
pluses plus seigniorage is achieved through three channels, as Woodford (1998a) ex-
plains. First, passive monetary policy endogenously expands the money stock to
clear the money market at the targeted nominal interest rate, creating seigniorage
revenue. Second, unexpectedly higher inﬂation revalues outstanding nominal debt.
Third, lower real interest rates make it possible to service a higher level of debt with
a given stream of primary surpluses.
If condition (30) imposes restrictions on the equilibrium price level, as it does in the
ﬁscal theory, then higher expected seigniorage tends to lower the current price level, an
association that seems perverse relative to conventional monetary theory. Of course,
(30) is one of several conditions for equilibrium. But this informal analysis oﬀers
a preview of the possibility that monetary disturbances may have unconventional
impacts in a ﬁscal theory equilibrium.
T h el o g i co ft h eﬁscal theory mechanism carries over directly to a regime-switching
environment. Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2004) show that in that environment the
ﬁscal theory is always at work, regardless of the prevailing regime. As long as there is
a positive probability of moving to a regime with active ﬁscal policy, agents’ decision
rules will reﬂect that probability and disturbances to current or expected future taxes
will generate wealth eﬀects that aﬀect aggregate demand. This occurs even if in
the current regime ﬁscal policy is passive and monetary policy is active. Whether
this logic is practically relevant depends on whether the ﬁscal theory mechanism is
quantitatively important. The paper now addresses this issue.
5. Calibration and Solution Method
Parameters describing preferences, technology and price adjustment for the model
in section 3 are speciﬁed to be consistent with Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and
Woodford (2003). The model’s frequency is quarterly. The markup of price over
marginal cost is set to 15 percent, implying µ = θ(1 − θ)−1 =1 .15, and 66 percent
of ﬁrms are unable to reset their price each period (ϕ = .66). The quarterly real
interest rate is set to 1 percent (β = .99). Preferences over consumption and leisureFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 18
are logarithmic (σ = η =1 )and χ is chosen to make steady state employment 0.2.
Each intermediate goods producing ﬁrm has access to a production function with
constant returns to labor. The technology parameter, A,i sc h o s e nt on o r m a l i z et h e
deterministic steady state level of output to be 1.
The preference parameter on real balances, δ, is set to ensure that velocity in the
deterministic steady state, deﬁned as cP/M, matches average U.S. monetary base
velocity at 2.4. This value comes from the period 1959-2004 and uses the average
real expenditure on non-durable consumption plus services. The parameter governing
the interest elasticity of real money balances, κ, is set to 2.6 [Mankiw and Summers
(1986), Lucas (1988), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000)].
Reaction coeﬃcients in the policy rules are taken from the estimates in tables 1
and 2 and the four-state joint transition matrix (4). The intercepts in the policy
rules govern the deterministic steady state values of inﬂation and debt-output in the
computational model. Intercepts are set so the deterministic steady state is common
across regimes and match their sample means from 1948:2-2004:1. Those values,
annualized, are π =3 .43 percent and b = .3525. Government purchases as a share of
output are ﬁxed in the model at their mean value of .115.
We compute the solution using the monotone map method, based on Coleman
(1991). The algorithm uses a discretized state space and requires a set of initial
decision rules that reduce the system to a set of non-linear expectational ﬁrst-order
diﬀerence equations. The complete model consists of the ﬁrst-order necessary con-
ditions from the households’ and ﬁrms’ optimization problems, constraints, speci-
ﬁcations of policy, the price adjustment process, and the transversality conditions
for real balances and bonds. The solution is a set of functions that map the state,
Θt = {bt−1,w t−1,∆t−1,θ t,ψ t,S t}, into values for the endogenous variables.
17
6. General Characteristics of Equilibrium
This section discusses the qualitative features of the computed equilibrium. In par-
ticular, we argue that the equilibrium is locally unique and stationary. An analytical
demonstration of these features is not available, so we rely on numerical arguments.
6.1. Uniqueness and Stationarity. Because monetary and ﬁscal regimes are free
to change independently of one another, the model temporarily permits policy combi-
nations with passive monetary and passive ﬁscal policies, as well as active monetary
and active ﬁscal policies. A passive-passive policy combination leaves the equilib-
rium undetermined in ﬁxed-regime versions of the model, admitting the possibility
17Details appear in appendix A. w is a wealth measure, deﬁned as wt ≡ Rtbt + Mt/Pt.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 19
that sunspot shocks aﬀect equilibrium allocations. An active-active policy combi-
nation implies either no equilibrium exists or, if it does exist, the equilibrium is
non-stationary. But when regimes obey a Markov process, an active-active mix does
not necessarily violate the transversality condition because agents correctly impute
positive probability to returning to a regime that prevents debt from growing too
rapidly. Similarly, temporarily passive-passive policies do not necessary leave the
equilibrium indeterminate. It is long-run policy behavior, not current behavior, that
determines the qualitative properties of existence and uniqueness.
To establish local uniqueness of the equilibrium, we perturb the converged decision
rules by a truncated normal random variable at every point in the state space and
check that the algorithm converges back to the initial set of rules. We repeated this
many times and the algorithm always converged to the initial converged decision
rules, leading us to infer the decision rules are locally unique.
We also checked how the monotone map algorithm behaves when it is known there
are multiple equilibria or no equilibrium exists. Using the ﬁxed-regime model with
PM/PF policies, the algorithm diverges; under AM/AF policies, the algorithm con-
verges, but implies a non-stationary path for debt. The regime-switching DSGE
model converges and produces a stationary path for debt, providing further evidence
that the equilibrium is locally unique and stationary.
Zero expected present value of debt, which the transversality condition implies, is
equivalent to the intertemporal equilibrium condition
bt = xt + zt, (31)
where x and z are the expected discounted present values of future primary surpluses
and seigniorage. We check whether (31) holds following an exogenous shock, con-
ditioning on remaining in each of the three stationary regimes–AM/PF, PM/PF,
PM/AF. We repeat this calculation with random realizations of regimes. The con-
dition is always satisﬁed, conﬁrming that the numerical solution is an equilibrium of
the model.
To assess the long-run properties of the model, ﬁgure 6 plots histograms from a
simulation of 250,000 periods. The top four panels are unconditional distributions
and the bottom four panels sort the sample by regime. The simulation randomly
draws policy shocks and policy regimes from their estimated distributions.
All regimes are stationary, as is apparent by inspection of the bottom 4 panels:
all distributions have ﬁnite means and variances.18 The estimated policy rules imply
that debt diverges very slowly under AM/AF policies. Although debt temporarily
18Francq and Zakoian (2001) show that Markov-switching processes can have explosive regimes,
yet the entire stochastic process can be stable. Davig (2004a) shows that a properly restrictedFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 20
follows a non-stationary path, the duration of the AM/AF regime is not suﬃciently
long nor is the growth rate of debt high enough to preclude stationary distributions
for debt and other variables.
7. Quantifying the Fiscal Theory Mechanism
To quantify the eﬀects of policy shocks, we report results based on two kinds
of impulse response functions. The ﬁrst conditions on regime to mimic responses
functions usually reported from identiﬁed VARs. The second reﬂects the “typical”
eﬀect of a policy shock by computing the distribution of equilibrium time paths after
a policy disturbance.
7.1. Non-Linear Impulse Response Analysis. When conditioning on regime, we
assume the initial state of the economy equals the regime-dependent mean. After
perturbing the error term in a policy rule, we solve for equilibrium time paths, holding
the prevailing regime ﬁxed, and report paths of variables relative to the baseline of





















where hk is the decision rule for variable k as a function of the state variables for
regime J and the realizations of i.i.d. policy disturbances, εr
t and ετ
t. ¯ xJ denotes the
mean of x in regime J. Following initial impact, policy shocks equal their means of















n is a function of the initial shocks because the impulse responses are history depen-
dent.
Also of interest is the average (“typical”) response of a variable, where the mean is
computed over future regimes. In this case, the impact period is computed as above,













where the realization of the decision rule depends on the current realization of regime,
Sn. We report various summary measures of the random variable ˆ φ
k
n.
Markov-switching process for discounted debt can have an explosive regime, yet satisfy the transver-
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7.2. AF i s c a lE x p a n s i o n .In every regime, a cut in taxes is ﬁnanced by new sales
of nominal government debt and generates wealth eﬀects that increase aggregate
demand, inﬂation, and output.
Figure 7 reports paths following a surprise tax reduction of two percent of output
in period 5, conditional on starting out and staying in each of the three stationary
regimes–AM/PF, PM/AF, and PM/PF. Regardless of the prevailing regime, the ﬁs-
cal theory mechanism is evident. A surprise tax cut raises inﬂation. Monetary policy
prevents the nominal interest rate from rising as much as expected inﬂation, reducing
the ex-ante real interest rate and raising output above potential. In all regimes, the
one-period tax cut has persistent eﬀects, lasting over 5 years when monetary policy is
passive (thin solid and dashed lines) and for many more years when monetary policy
is active (thick solid lines). Figure 7 illustrates the three sources of ﬁscal ﬁnancing:
inﬂation jumps unexpectedly on impact, revaluing debt; the real interest rate falls,
raising the expected discounted present values of surpluses and seigniorage; future
inﬂation and, therefore, seigniorage increases.
Active monetary policy appears to dramatically dampen the tax eﬀects on output
and inﬂation. In fact, a strong response of the nominal interest rate to inﬂation
spreads the responses to taxes over many periods and actually results in larger long-
run eﬀects from ﬁscal disturbances. In a linear model, the Taylor principle creates
explosive inﬂation dynamics following an i.i.d. shock, so it may seem anomalous that
the inﬂation process is stationary in the AM/PF regime. Davig, Leeper, and Chung
(2004) show, in an endowment version of this model, that an AM/PF regime creates
wealth eﬀects that make the forecast error in inﬂation serially correlated, depending
negatively on past inﬂation and positively on past real debt. These surprises in
inﬂation are a key feature of the ﬁscal theory mechanism, as they serve to revalue
debt. Through the Taylor principle, higher πt raises Rt, which increases future debt
service. Because regimes can switch, agents expect some debt service to be met with
future seigniorage. But ﬁgure 7 conditions on remaining in the AM/PF regime, so
taxes are unexpectedly high, which reduces aggregate demand and stabilizes inﬂation.
Generalized impulse response functions bring out the role that the evolution of
regime plays in aﬀecting economic agents’ expectations and choices. Dynamic impacts
of policy disturbances display important diﬀerences from their counterparts in ﬁgure
7. For the three stationary regimes, ﬁgure 8 plots the mean and one standard deviation
bands of the generalized impulse responses following a ﬁscal expansion. The ﬁrst four
periods condition on the stationary mean in a given regime, period 5 imposes the
shock and holds regime ﬁxed, and draws of regimes are taken from period 6 on.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 22
Factoring in future regime changes alters the predictions one makes about the
dynamic path of the economy following a tax cut. A one-period ﬁscal expansion gen-
erates a hump-shaped response of inﬂation and output; the hump is more pronounced
when the initial regime is AM/PF policies. The responses resemble those arising from
identiﬁed VARs focusing on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. When monetary policy is pas-
sive, the inﬂation and output responses are stronger in the short run, but die out
more quickly. Generalized response functions also imply that when the initial regime
entails passive ﬁscal policy, there is a substantial probability that a few years after
the ﬁscal expansion both output and inﬂation will fall below their pre-shock levels.
7.3. Tax Multipliers. We compute several summary measures of tax eﬀects, both
conditional on the economy remaining in the current regime and unconditional, av-
eraging across future realizations of regime. The measures quantify the impacts of a
one-time exogenous change in taxes, either unanticipated or anticipated.
Table 4 reports tax multipliers, computed as the discounted present value of addi-




s=0q0,s(ys − y), where q0,s is the stochastic discount factor, computed for the
horizons n =5 ,10,25, and for the long run (∞).
Ao n e - t i m e$1 surprise tax cut raises the discounted present value of future output
in the long run by $1.02 in the AM/PF regime, by 76 cents in the PM/PF regime, and
by 98 cents in the PM/AF regime. The table highlights the stronger persistence of
output under active monetary policy, where after 25 quarters the discounted present
value of additional output is only 42 cents. Under passive monetary policy, the
additional eﬀects of the tax cut have largely dissipated after 25 quarters.
The ﬁscal theory does not sharply delineate between the impacts of unanticipated
and anticipated changes in taxes. As expression (30) emphasizes, the ﬁscal theory
focuses on how ﬂuctuations in the expected discounted present value of taxes impact
current aggregate demand. The lower panel of table 4 reports output multipliers when
households anticipate a tax cut next period.19 The multipliers under foreknowledge
of taxes are similar to the multipliers from a tax surprise, conﬁr m i n gt h a ti ti st h e
change in the expected discounted present value of primary surpluses that is central
to the ﬁscal theory mechanism.
Table 4 shows the proportion of the marginal addition to debt arising from a tax
cut that is backed by an increase in discounted primary surpluses. Under an AM/PF
policy, two-thirds of new debt is backed by discounted primary surpluses, in contrast
to ﬁxed-regime models, where the proportion is 100 percent. The proportions under
19The decision rules are functions of the expanded information set Ω∗
t, deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n3 . 4 .Y a n g
(2004b) explores the implications of foreknowledge of tax rates in a neo-classical growth model.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 23
PM/PF and PM/AF are 59 percent and 49 percent. Consequently, the PM/AF
regime experiences the strongest wealth eﬀect on impact from a tax cut, as ﬁgure 7
makes apparent. Much of this adjustment arises from the lower real interest rates
that are used to discount future surpluses and seigniorage.
In the model, it is highly unusual for policy regime to remain unchanged, as the
calculations in table 4 assume. Typically, after a policy disturbance, regimes evolve
according to their estimated transition matrices. Table 5 reports 80th percentile
ranges for the tax multipliers, computed from 10,000 draws of regimes, using the
generalized impulse response function deﬁn e di n( 3 4 ) . A tt h e8 0 t hp e r c e n t i l e ,a$ 1
tax cut raises the discounted present value of output from 76 cents to $1.36 after 6
years, depending on the initial regime.
Table 6 reports the price level eﬀects of a one-period tax shock, conditional on
regime. In the long run, a transitory tax cut of 2 percent of output raises the price
level by 6.7 percent under AM/PF policies. At a little over 1 percent, the long-run
price eﬀects are substantially smaller when monetary policy is passive. At shorter
horizons, taxes have larger price eﬀects when monetary policy is passive than when
it is active. Table 7 records typical price level impacts, accounting for possible future
regimes. These impacts can be substantial, with the price level more than 2 percent
higher 6 years after the tax cut. Uncertainty about realizations of future regimes
creates a wide range of possible output and price level impacts from tax changes, as
tables 5 and 7 attest.
20
7.4. A Monetary Expansion. In the model’s ﬁscal theory equilibrium, an expan-
sionary monetary policy disturbance generates conventional short-run responses–
lower real interest rate and higher output and inﬂation–but unconventional longer
run impacts–higher real interest rate and lower output and inﬂation [ﬁgure 9]. Un-
derlying the transitory monetary expansion is an open-market purchase of debt that
leaves households holding less government debt. This negative wealth eﬀect is not
neutralized in the model, as it is with a ﬁxed AM/PF regime, because the estimated
policy process implies that future taxes do not fall in the long run by enough to
counteract the decline in wealth from lower debt.
Although the longer run impacts of a monetary disturbance are unconventional by
most criteria, the positive correlation between the nominal interest rate and future
inﬂation that appears in ﬁgure 9 is a feature of many monetary VARs [Sims (1992)].
20Appendix B considers an alternative speciﬁcation of the policy process that increases the du-
ration of the active monetary policy regime by labeling as active the periods after the recessions in
1991 and 2001, which section 2 estimated as passive monetary policy. This reduces the quantitative
impacts of tax shocks, though the ﬁscal theory mechanism remains important.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 24
This “price puzzle,” which is discussed in more detail in the next section, is a feature
of the equilibrium generated by the ﬁscal theory mechanism.
8. Some Empirical Implications
Many studies of monetary policy condition on policy regime and then estimate
policy rules. To interpret the estimates, the estimated rules are embedded in a ﬁxed-
regime variant of the model in section 3. This section illustrates some pitfalls of
this approach when data are generated by an environment with recurring changes in
policy regimes.
We imagine that the calibrated model with the estimated switching process gen-
erated observed time series. Three sources of stochastic variation and the model’s
non-linearity are suﬃcient to ensure that a ﬁve-variable VAR ﬁt to taxes, the nomi-
nal interest rate, the output gap, inﬂation, and the real value of debt is stochastically
non-singular. In the identiﬁed VAR, only the policy rules are restricted. Output,
inﬂation, and debt are treated as a triangular block which, as in the DSGE model,
is permitted to respond contemporaneously to monetary and tax disturbances. The
policy rules are speciﬁed as
rt = α0 + αππt + αxxt + ε
r
t (35)
τt = γ0 + γxxt + γbbt−1 + ε
τ
t. (36)
Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we impose the response of taxes to output,
but freely estimate the response to debt. Counting only contemporaneous restrictions,
the model is just identiﬁed if we estimate the response of monetary policy to inﬂation,
but impose its response to output.
The econometrician estimates ﬁxed-regime identiﬁed VARs with data generated by
the DSGE model under two diﬀerent assumptions about the econometrician’s ap r i o r i
information. In one case, the econometrician believes the full sample comes from a
single policy regime; in other cases, the econometrician believes regime changes have
occurred and has extra-sample information that identiﬁes which regimes prevailed
over various sub-samples. Simulated data in the ﬁrst case draws both policy shocks
and regime, while in the other cases the simulation conditions on regime and draws
only policy shocks.21 After estimating the VARs, the econometrician seeks to interpret
the ﬁndings in the context of a ﬁxed-regime DSGE model.
The identiﬁed VARs obtain accurate quantitative estimates of policy parameters
and the impacts of policy shocks. Table 8 reports four sets of estimates of the feedback
21But the data are generated by decision rules based on the “true” regime-switching process.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 25
parameters απ and γb. The “All Regimes” estimates come from the full sample and
the other columns condition on the indicated regime. All the estimates that condition
on regime recover the correct policy parameters and the associated regimes. The “All
Regimes” estimates suggest that a researcher using a long sample of data would infer
that, on average, monetary policy is passive and ﬁscal policy is active.
Figure 10 shows estimates of the dynamic impacts of policy shocks from the iden-
tiﬁed VARs. Tax disturbances have important impacts on output and inﬂation, both
conditional on regime and in the full sample. Active monetary policy diminishes the
size of the period-by-period impacts, but induces such extreme serial correlation that
the total impacts are substantial. Monetary contractions have conventional short-
run eﬀects (lower output and inﬂation), but unconventional longer run eﬀects (higher
output and inﬂation), owing to the resulting wealth eﬀects engendered by the ﬁscal
theory mechanism. The rise in future inﬂation resembles the price puzzle Sims (1992)
discovered in monetary VARs. That puzzle is more pronounced when monetary pol-
icy is passive, consistent with Hanson’s (2004) ﬁndings that in U.S. data the puzzle is
more severe in samples that include data before 1979, a period that section 2 labels
passive monetary policy. Both the parameter estimates and the impulse response
functions the econometrician obtains are quantitatively consistent with those in the
switching model underlying the simulated data (given that the econometrician knows
αx and γx ap r i o r i ).
Connecting these quantitative results to ﬁxed-regime theories can lead to qual-
itatively misleading inferences. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) use diﬀerent econometric methods, but both condition on mone-
tary policy regime and both conclude that since the early 1980s, U.S. monetary policy
has been active, while from 1960-1979, monetary policy was passive. Both sets of au-
thors maintain the assumption that ﬁscal policy was passive throughout, leading in
their ﬁxed-regime DSGE models to Ricardian equivalence in the recent sub-sample
and indeterminacy in the earlier sub-sample. The results for AM/PF (thick solid
lines) in ﬁgure 10 are diﬃcult to reconcile with Ricardian equivalence. Similarly, in
the sub-sample where the estimated rules imply PM/PF (thin solid lines), the econo-
metrician would infer the equilibrium is indeterminate and be compelled to interpret
the policy impacts as arising from correlations between sunspot shocks and policy
shocks. But the simulated data were generated by locally unique decision rules.
Employing the full sample, the econometrician estimates the policy impacts shown
by dashed lines in ﬁgure 10. Moreover, using the “All Regimes” parameter estimates
in a ﬁxed-regime version of the model in section 3, produces the policy impacts rep-
resented by lines in the ﬁgure punctuated with x’s. In contrast to the estimates thatFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 26
condition on regime, the full sample estimates deliver qualitatively correct inferences
about policy eﬀects. Correct qualitative inferences require nailing down the correct
long-run behavior of policy. That long-run behavior is better gleaned from a long
sample that includes the possible realizations of regimes than from sub-samples that
condition on regime.22
9. Concluding Remarks
Existing work on policy rules is based on a logical inconsistency: it assumes regime
cannot change and then proceeds to analyze the implications of alternative regimes.
This paper takes a step toward resolving this inconsistency. A simple and plausible
empirical speciﬁcation of regime change ﬁnds that U.S. monetary and ﬁscal policies
have ﬂuctuated among active and passive rules. Treating that evidence of regime
change in an internally consistent manner can signiﬁcantly alter interpretations of
the historical period and of monetary and ﬁscal policies more generally. Both the
empirical speciﬁcation and the economic model are very simple, leaving much room
for improving ﬁt to data. This is an important area for continued research.
This paper has not addressed why policy regimes change. This is a hard question,
but it is the same hard question that can be asked of any model with a stochastic
component to policy behavior. Although Sims (1987) oﬀers a rationale for why op-
timal policy might include a component that is random to private agents, there is
certainly no consensus on this issue. Lack of consensus, however, does not undermine
the utility of simply postulating the existence of policy shocks and then tracing out
their inﬂuence in data and in models. In this paper, we have followed the convention
of assuming some part of policy behavior is random.
Under the working hypothesis of recurring regime change, this paper shows that
when estimated Markov-switching rules for monetary and tax policies are embedded in
a DSGE model calibrated to U.S. data, lump-sum taxes have quantitatively important
eﬀects on aggregate demand, output, and inﬂation. In the model, tax non-neutralities
arise because the estimates imply that agents always place positive probability mass
on an active ﬁscal regime in the future, a belief that makes the ﬁscal theory of the
price level operative.
Of course, the ﬁscal theory is not the only source of tax non-neutralities in actual
data. A full accounting of tax eﬀects requires introducing some of the panoply of
reasons oﬀered for why taxes might be non-neutral–distortions, life-cycle considera-
tions, and so forth. In any case, the quantitative predictions of this paper strongly
22Unless there is compelling evidence that agents believe the prevailing regime is permanent.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 27
s u g g e s tt h a tt h eﬁscal theory mechanism should be added to the list of usual suspects
for the breakdown of Ricardian equivalence.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 28
Appendix A. Solution Method
Implementation of the algorithm begins by conjecturing an initial set of rules, which
we take to be the solution from the model’s ﬁxed-regime counterpart. Speciﬁcally,
we take the solutions from the ﬁxed-regime model with AM/PF and PM/AF policies
as the initial rules for the corresponding regimes in the non-synchronous switching
model. For the AM/AF and PM/PF regimes there are no stationary, unique ﬁxed-
regime counterparts, so we use the solution from the PM/AF ﬁxed-regime model
to initialize the algorithm. To ensure the solution is not sensitive to initial condi-
tions, we also use the solution from the AM/PF regime and weighted averages of the
two. Further perturbations of the initial rules have no eﬀect on the ﬁnal solution,
suggesting the solution is locally unique. This appendix more fully draws out con-
nections between determinacy and uniqueness in linear models with convergence of
the monotone map algorithm.
Taking the initial rules for labor, b hN(Θt)=Nt, and the functions determining the
ﬁrm’s optimal pricing decision, b hK1(Θt)=K1,t and b hK2(Θt)=K2,t,w eﬁnd values

















t + ϕβEtb h
K2(Θt+1), (39)
where hC(Θt)=( A/∆t)b hN(Θt)−g.G i v e nNt,K 1,t,K 2,t, we compute the endogenous
variables. Note that ∆t, bt and wt = Rtbt +Mt/Pt are states at t+1. Gauss-Hermite
integration is used over possible values for εr
t+1,ε τ







, EtK1,t+1,E tK2,t+1, which reduces the above system to three equations
in three unknowns. The (net) nominal interest rate is restricted to always be positive.
When solving the above system, the state vector and the decision rules are taken
as given. The system is solved for every set of state variables deﬁned over a discrete
partition of the state space. This procedure is repeated until the iteration improves
the current decision rules at any given state vector by less than some   =1 e − 12.
Appendix B. An Alternative Policy Process
Many authors have argued that monetary policy has been active since around 1979.
Since our empirical estimates indicate two brief episodes of passive monetary policy
after 1979, this section conducts a sensitivity analysis that adjusts the transition
matrix to be consistent with an active monetary regime for the entire post 1979
sample. This exercise highlights that the general message of the paper, namely thatFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 29
ﬁscal shocks have important real eﬀects even under AM/PF policy, carries into an
environment with a more persistent active monetary policy.
Our empirical estimates indicate that there are a total of 28 quarters of passive
monetary policy after 1979. Relabeling these periods as active monetary policy re-
sults in 44.2 percent of all periods having active monetary policy. There is no unique
way of adjusting the transition matrix so that 44.2 percent of periods are active. How-
ever, increasing the persistence of the active monetary regime, instead of decreasing
the persistence of the passive regime, is more consistent with the priors of many re-
searchers that the U.S. has had active monetary policy since 1979. So, we adjust
the transition matrix by increasing the transition probability of staying in the active
regime, conditioning on being in the active regime, from .9505 to .9779.
To summarize the eﬀects of a more persistent active monetary regime, tables anal-
ogous to those reported in the paper are computed [tables 9-12].. The proportion of
new debt backed by discounted surpluses increase in all regimes as the persistence
of the active monetary regime increases. However, the primary diﬀerences that arise
relative to the baseline speciﬁcation occur under AM/PF policy. Across all time hori-
zons, a more persistent active monetary regime diminishes the impacts ﬁscal shocks
have on output and inﬂation. For example, the increase in all additional discounted
output under AM/PF policy arising from a $1 tax reduction is 61 cents, compared
to $1.02 under the baseline speciﬁcation.
Fraction of new debt
PV(∆y)
∆τ after
Regime backed by PV of taxes 5 quarter 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
AM/PF .801 −.053 −.099 −.213 −.607
PM/PF .588 −.512 −.683 −.758 −.760
PM/AF .490 −.619 −.853 −.976 −.981
Table 9. Output multipliers for taxes conditional on regime. Uses the
alternative policy process that makes monetary policy active after the
1991 and 2001 recessions.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 30
PV(∆y)
∆τ after
Initial Regime 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters
AM/PF [−.062,−.066] [−.107,−.667] [−.218,−.959]
PM/PF [−.172,−.174] [−.192,−.512] [−.249,−.655]
PM/AF [−.314,−.317] [−.447,−.799] [−.802,−1.252]
Table 10. Output multipliers for taxes, unconditional: 80th percentile
bands based on 10,000 draws. Uses the alternative policy process that
makes monetary policy active after the 1991 and 2001 recessions.
%∆P after
Regime 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
AM/PF .166 .331 .798 5.128
PM/PF .765 1.073 1.231 1.236
PM/AF .942 1.364 1.620 1.633
Table 11. Cumulative eﬀect on price level of an i.i.d. unanticipated
tax cut of 2 percent of output. Uses the alternative policy process that
makes monetary policy active after the 1991 and 2001 recessions.
%∆P after
Initial Regime 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters
AM/PF [.166,.180] [.331,1.206] [.798,1.906]
PM/PF [.673,.765] [.837,1.073] [.542,1.231]
PM/AF [.943,1.001] [1.292,1.546] [1.621,2.233]
Table 12. Cumulative eﬀect on the price level of an i.i.d. tax cut of
2 percent of output, unconditional: 80th percentile bands based on
10,000 draws. Uses the alternative policy process that makes monetary
policy active after the 1991 and 2001 recessions.
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Table 3. Monetary and ﬁscal policy transition matricesFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 38
Fraction of new debt
PV(∆y)
∆τ after
Regime backed by PV of taxes 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
Conventional information set Ωt
AM/PF .673 −.108 −.199 −.417 −1.019
PM/PF .586 −.515 −.686 −.759 −.761
PM/AF .488 −.623 −.855 −.976 −.981
Foreknowledge information set Ω∗
t
AM/PF - −.106 −.195 −.410 −.997
PM/PF - −.460 −.612 −679 −.681
PM/AF - −.556 −.762 −.873 −.877
Table 4. Output multipliers for taxes conditional on regime
PV(∆y)
∆τ after
Initial Regime 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters
AM/PF [−.126,−.400] [−.213,−.754] [−.430,−.922]
PM/PF [−.215,−.401] [−.271,−.623] [−.414,−.764]
PM/AF [−.365,−.568] [−.537,−.928] [−.993,−1.363]
Table 5. Output multipliers for taxes, unconditional: 80th percentile
bands based on 10,000 draws
%∆P after
Regime 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
AM/PF 0.324 0.641 1.513 6.704
PM/PF 0.770 1.077 1.232 1.237
PM/AF 0.949 1.369 1.620 1.633
Table 6. Cumulative eﬀect on price level of an i.i.d. unanticipated tax
cut of 2 percent of outputFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 39
%∆P after
Initial Regime 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters
AM/PF [.324,.687] [.641,1.306] [1.158,2.160]
PM/PF [.678,.770] [.840,1.077] [.533,1.232]
PM/AF [.949,1.008] [1.325,1.551] [1.610,2.269]
Table 7. Cumulative eﬀect on the price level of an i.i.d. tax cut of 2
percent of output, unconditional: 80th percentile bands based on 10,000
draws
All Regimes AM/PF PM/PF PM/AF
απ 0.723 1.308 0.595 0.528
γb 0.002 0.016 0.018 −0.003
Table 8. Policy parameters from identiﬁed VAR estimated on simu-
lated data. “All Regimes” from stochastic simulation drawing from
regime; others are conditional on regime. Estimated equations are
τt = γ0 + γxxt + γbbt−1 + ετ
t, rt = α0 + αππt + αxxt + εR
t ,w i t hγx
and αx restricted to values used to simulate model. Samples of length
10,000.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 40














Figure 1. Actual and predicted paths of the nominal interest rate
from estimates of the monetary policy rule, equation (1) using smoothed
and ﬁltered probabilities.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 41













Figure 2. Actual and predicted paths of the tax-output ratio from
estimates of the tax policy rule, equation ( 2), using smoothed and
ﬁltered probabilities.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 42





















Figure 3. Smoothed (solid line) and ﬁltered (dashed line) probabilities.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 43













Figure 4. Smoothed (solid line) and ﬁltered (dashed line) probabilities.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 44
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Figure 5. Smoothed (solid line) and ﬁltered (dashed line) probabilities.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 45
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Figure 6. Distributions: unconditional and conditional. Top four
panels are unconditional distributions, taking draws from policy shocks
and regimes; bottom four panels are conditional on regime, sorting
observations by designated regime. AM/PF (thick solid), AM/AF
(dashed), PM/PF (dotted-dashed), PM/AF (thin solid).FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 46
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Figure 7. Responses to an i.i.d. tax cut of 2 percent of output, con-
ditional on remaining in the prevailing regime.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 47






AM/PF : π  (Change basis pts)




PM/PF : π  (Change basis pts)




PM/AF : π  (Change basis pts)





AM/PF : Output gap (%)





PM/PF : Output gap (%)




PM/AF : Output gap (%)
Figure 8. Responses to an i.i.d. tax cut, given the regime at the date
of the shock and drawing from regime over the forecast horizon.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 48
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Figure 9. Responses to an i.i.d. monetary expansion, conditional on
remaining in the prevailing regime.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 49
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Figure 10. Impacts of policy shocks. Estimated from simulated data
and produced by ﬁxed-regime DSGE model.